Child Penalties in Politics

Jon H. Fiva[1]   Max-Emil M. King[2]

Economic Journal

[1]BI Norwegian Business School. E-mail: jon.h.fiva@bi.no
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# The Labor Market 'Child Penalty' in Norway

Population

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
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Population

Income (USD 1,000s) vs Event time (yrs)

Women | Men

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We answer this question using data from Norway:

- Gender-equal society where most political parties introduced gender quotas decades ago
- Data: Universe of candidates running for office matched with administrative registers of Statistics Norway

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- Women in office may serve as role models that improve perceptions of female leaders and weaken stereotypes in society (e.g. Beaman et al., 2009; Gilardi, 2015; Ladam et al., 2018)

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- Part-time appointments with small remunerations ▸ How small?

Table: Political selection by level of government and politicians' gender

Level	Gender quota	Female	Children Women	Men	Years of educ. Women	Men	Income Women	Men
National level								
Cabinet (N = 528)	Party	42.2 %	1.51	1.73	16.3	15.9	113.4	112.8
Parliament (N = 845)	Party	40.6 %	1.70	1.82	15.4	14.7	103.5	104.5
Candidate (N = 18,316)	Party	42.3 %	1.77	1.83	14.2	13.8	50.4	57.4
Regional level								
Council (N = 3,373)	Party	44.8 %	1.88	1.88	14.4	14.1	64.7	75.5
Candidate (N = 33,423)	Party	43.6 %	1.97	2.00	14.1	13.6	45.3	53.7
Local level								
Mayor (N = 2,060)	-	24.6 %	2.40	2.38	14.8	13.9	80.7	86.3
Executive board (N = 15,141)	Law	41.3 %	2.22	2.33	14.4	13.8	59.6	74.0
Council (N = 51,799)	Party	37.8 %	2.07	2.20	14.2	13.5	52.0	65.7
Candidate (N = 292,590)	Party	41.4 %	2.07	2.05	13.6	13.1	40.0	52.9
Population (N = 4,218,917)	-	49.9 %	1.64	1.42	13.0	12.7	35.9	50.4

Data

Universe of candidates 2003, 2007, ..., 2019

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- Baseline sample: 23,935 candidate-year obs. ▸ Summary stats

Identification

Baseline Diff-in-Diff:

$$Y_{ist} = \sum_{j \neq -1} \alpha_j \cdot \mathbf{I}[j = t] + \sum_{j \neq -1} \beta_j \cdot \mathbf{I}[j = t] \cdot \mathbf{I}[female_i] + \gamma \cdot \mathbf{I}[female_i] +$$

$$\sum_{l} \delta_l \cdot \mathbf{I}[l = age_{is}] + \sum_{y} \eta_y \cdot \mathbf{I}[y = s] + \sum_{p} \pi_p \cdot \mathbf{I}[p = party_i] + \epsilon_{ist}$$

Y_{ist} represents a political outcome for candidate i at event-time t and year s. The coefficients of interest are β_j. SEs clustered at the individual level.

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
Y_{ist} *represents a political outcome for candidate* i *at event-time* t *and year* s.
*The coefficients of interest are* β_j. *SEs clustered at the individual level.*

**Identifying assumption:** Parallel trends

Results

Outcome: Elected into office

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Local election outcomes

Panel A: Raw data

Running — Elected — Leadership

Women — Men

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

Running — Elected — Leadership

Example: 2015 Oslo Labour Party list

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- Outcome: **High w/ bonus**

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- Outcome: **High w/o bonus**

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

- Outcome: **Low w/o bonus**

Mothers receive less viable spots (unconditional on candidacy)

Panel A: Raw data

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

Robustness

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- Individual-level FE

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- Individual-level FE   ▸ Robustness I
- Restricted sample (running at $t = -1$ only)   ▸ Robustness II

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Placebo

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Extensions

- Higher-level political outcomes   ▸ Extension I

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- Higher-level political outcomes   ▸ Extension I
- Labor outcomes   ▸ Extension II
- Partners' labor outcomes   ▸ Extension III

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- A shock to mothers' own supply of political candidacies? (see, e.g., Andresen & Nix, 2021; Kleven, Landais & Søgaard, 2019)

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- Discrimination from voters or from party leaders?

Mechanisms

I: Voter discrimination not a likely factor

Average Voteshare around Parenthood

More evidence I   More evidence II

II: Norms may be important

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- We split at the median in the ▸ distribution of division of labor index I

II: Norms may be important

Sample split by upbringing

Panel A: Main outcomes

Remedies

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- **'Family friendly'** (daytime) municipalities (n=106)
- All other municipalities (n=290)

Mothers aged 18-40 are over-represented in "family friendly" municipalities

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- Some evidence that making political work more compatible with family life might be effective remedies

Thanks!

Histogram of local council members, by gender and age

Remuneration for local political roles

Note: The figure plots survey responses collected from local political office holders in 2011 (N=2,234).

Back to Setting

Table: Summary Statistics by Sample

Panel A: Politicians	Full sample		Women		Men	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Event-time $k = -1$						
Female (percent)	40.03	49.00				
Age	31.07	5.52	29.17	4.17	32.33	5.93
Income, constant (2015) USD 1000s	58.81	30.35	50.45	23.90	64.39	32.82
Years of education	14.59	2.78	15.33	2.52	14.10	2.84
Number of children (as of 2021)	1.91	0.73	1.89	0.68	1.93	0.76
N	4,787		1,916		2,871	

Panel B: Population	Full sample		Women		Men	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Event-time $k = -1$						
Female (percent)	49.75	50.00				
Age	28.98	5.50	27.78	4.99	30.16	5.72
Income, constant (2015) USD 1000s	49.11	32.50	41.57	25.28	56.57	36.84
Years of education	13.57	3.20	13.95	3.18	13.19	3.17
Number of children (as of 2021)	1.97	0.77	1.98	0.76	1.96	0.78
N	796,471		396,271		400,200	

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Local election outcomes (Individual-level FEs)

Panel A: Raw data

Running · Elected · Leadership

Women ● Men ■

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

Running · Elected · Leadership

Back to Robustness

Local election outcomes (Candidacy at $t = -1$)

Panel A: Raw data

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

Back to Robustness

Table: Baseline results by cohorts

|	Running			Elected			Leadership		
	(1) 2007	(2) 2011	(3) 2015	(4) 2007	(5) 2011	(6) 2015	(7) 2007	(8) 2011	(9) 2015
Female $\times$ $t=-3$			-0.025 (0.030)			-0.003 (0.016)			-0.005 (0.007)
Female $\times$ $t=-2$		-0.056 (0.039)	0.040 (0.034)		-0.007 (0.018)	0.001 (0.016)		-0.005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)
Female $\times$ $t=-1$	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Female $\times$ $t=0$	-0.002 (0.031)	-0.118*** (0.027)	-0.062*** (0.023)	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)
Female $\times$ $t=1$	-0.047* (0.028)	-0.040 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.028* (0.015)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.008)
Female $\times$ $t=2$	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.059** (0.027)		-0.061** (0.025)	-0.032* (0.017)		-0.010 (0.014)	-0.017** (0.008)	
Female $\times$ $t=3$	-0.030 (0.026)			-0.062** (0.025)			-0.025* (0.014)		
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,790	8,410	9,735	5,790	8,410	9,735	5,790	8,410	9,735
Clusters	1,158	1,682	1,947	1,158	1,682	1,947	1,158	1,682	1,947
R-squared	0.37	0.25	0.23	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02

Childless candidates (Candidacy in 2003)

### Panel A: Raw data

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

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Distributions of "placebo child penalties" (r = 1,000)


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Higher-level political outcomes

Panel A: Raw data

Women   Men

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

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Labor Outcomes

Panel A: Raw data

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

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Labor Outcomes for Partners

Panel A: Raw data

Men politicians · Partners of men politicians
Women politicians · Partners of women politicians

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

Partners vs. men politicians
Women politicians vs. partners

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
Table: Relationship Between Motherhood and *Pr(Elected)*

	Women			Men		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No children	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Children	0.18**	0.17**	0.19***	0.60***	0.52***	0.42***
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.045)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.040)
Incumbent	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rank FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Party bonus	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	94,431	94,431	94,431	129,233	129,233	129,233
Clusters	1,563	1,563	1,563	1,563	1,563	1,563
R-squared	0.39	0.46	0.77	0.37	0.48	0.77

Hypothetical election outcomes (w/o personal votes)

Panel A: Raw data

Panel B: Coefficient estimates

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
Distribution of Grandparents' Division of Labor Index